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South Korean nation branding and the building of competitiveness society 
Which pressures, which responses? 
“Diplomacy in the 21st century will center around economy and culture. We must keep 
expanding trade, investment, tourism and cultural exchanges in order to make our way in the 
age of boundless competition which will take place against a backdrop of cooperation.” (Kim 
Dae-jung 1998) 
Introduction 
Global competitiveness has become the most urgent imperative for contemporary states to 
respond to. The European Management Forum commented, as early as 1979: 
“competitiveness has become to economics what gravity is to physics: one (of) the 
fundamental forces which underlie the major events […] like gravity, it is a force that one 
cannot escape. It affects equally companies that need to grow, individuals who want to 
preserve their jobs, and, of course, nations to sustain and increase their standard of living. 
Understanding how competitiveness works is necessary for all.” (EMF 1979) Competitiveness 
has now been normalized, accepted as an inexorable force to which nations should adapt. 
Fougner notes: “The prominence and meta-character of the ‘competitiveness problem’ in 
contemporary reflections on state governance can hardly be exaggerated”. (Fougner 2006, 165)  
No state has taken this imperative as seriously as South Korea. From the end of the military 
dictatorship in the 1980s up to now, South Korean governments have led strategies to open 
Korea to the world, and make it a global country, responding to a perceived necessity to 
“globalize or perish” and to upgrade South Korean competitiveness in an era of “boundless 
competition” (Kim Dae-jung 1998). They have attempted to build what is probably the world 
most sustained and encompassing strategy to attain and maintain national competitiveness. 
This was implemented through the Segyehwa (globalization) policy of President Kim Young-
Sam or the Global Korea policy of Lee Myung-Bak, which culminated in the nation branding 
strategy put in place by Lee Myung-bak from 2008 to 2013. The Korean example is revealing 
of a global trend: nations have entered the realm of competitiveness, and thus adapt the tools 
of corporate competitiveness to boost their nation brands’ success in the “global market place 
of nations”. This is not only about finding policy responses to foster national companies’ 
competitiveness. This also entails a more encompassing strategy of branding the nation for 
itself. 
South Korea has thus become what I call a “competitiveness society”, a social sphere where 
all elements and relations of the social are subject to the imperative of competitiveness. In 
order to define what I identify as a competitiveness society, I will rely on two sources. I will 
first work from Cerny’s notion of “competition state”, which he saw as the new state form 
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that would emerge from the demise of the welfare state, and ultimately lead all states to adopt 
an orthodox neoliberal model to respond to global competitiveness. I will complement 
Cerny’s approach and its limitations by relying on Michel Foucault’s notion of neoliberal 
governmentality. What is essential in Foucault’s approach is that it goes beyond the political 
economic domain, and enables us to understand how the state’s actions towards competition 
do not limit themselves to the economic realm, but rather encompass all sites of social life. 
Indeed, as Foucault noted, neoliberalism “is about turning market, competition, and 
consequently firm, into what we could call the informing force of society.” (Foucault 2004, 54) 
Conceptualizing Korean society as an archetype, or at least an example, of “competitiveness 
society” highlights the fact that late modern capitalism has turned competitiveness, not into an 
economic force that necessitate political responses, but rather into a project of government, 
that needs to be addressed as such.  
This leads me to unveil the discursive absurdity of the discourse of competitiveness. Indeed, 
capitalism promises to end poverty and bring prosperity to all human beings, and the current 
liberal-dominated international order conveys this very egalitarian promise. Nevertheless, it is 
semantically absurd, come to think of it, to rely on a principle of the zero-sum game of 
competitiveness to save all from the evils of misery. If competitiveness, as the discursive 
embodiment of the capitalist ethos and raison d’être, is about survival of the fittest and not 
being “left behind” (interview with a nation branding consultant, London, 2014), then it 
cannot fulfill its promise of world shared prosperity.  
In this paper, I will first recall the roots of the ideology of global competitiveness, and how it 
has acquired supremacy in contemporary governance. This will lead me to discuss the notion 
of “competition state” introduced by Cerny, and complete it with the help of Fougner and 
Foucault, introducing the notion of “competitiveness society”, which seeks to move beyond 
the strictly political economic sphere and understand the effects of contemporary capitalism 
with a wider view of the social realm.  
I will then look at Korea and develop a demonstration to show that contemporary Korea can 
be seen as the embodiment of the competitiveness society. What is notable in the Korean 
example is the political will behind this society-wide transformation, and its particularly 
explicit character. To sustain this argument, I will first recall the successive governments’ 
developmental strategies from the early 1960s to the early 2000s, emphasizing their common 
underlying project. Although their mobilization power seems less obvious after the fall of the 
authoritarian regime put in place by Park Chung-Hee and his successors until the late 1980s, it 
should not be forgotten that citizens can be targets of developmental mobilization even under 
a constitutionally democratic regime. 
It will then focus on the effects of new policies responding to renewed competitiveness 
pressures in South Korea. I will present the main features of Pres. Lee Myung-Bak’s nation 
branding project, and emphasize the continuity with the core developmental path taken by the 
country from the 1960s. But this nation branding strategy should also be linked to legal, 
economic and political transformations under the competitiveness imperative. Therefore I will 
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also consider the changes in labor regulations, and the role of development diplomacy in this 
competitiveness framework.  
Underlying the mobilization of citizens under the competitiveness imperative will enable me 
to bring citizens to the fore, and to talk about a “competitiveness society”, rather than of a 
“competitiveness economy”.  
 
From the competition state to the competitiveness society 
The 1990s have seen the emergence of an academic literature that predicted that states no 
longer had control over their territories and people, and would be swayed away by the forces 
of globalization. Such defenders of the “end of the state” include Ohmae (1990; 1995), Badie 
and Smouts (1999) or Strange (1991). In Rival States, Rival Firms, Strange underlined the 
growing power of transnational corporations that threaten the independent power of states to 
define their policies.  
Indeed, she argues, “Firms have become more involved with governments and governments 
have come to recognize their increased dependence on the scarce resources controlled by 
firms.” and“the emergence of new forms of global competition among firms also affects how 
states compete for wealth.” (Strange 1991, 1) Accordingly, states are undermined in their 
capacity to control economic events (Strange 1991, 14) and have to accommodate the 
growing power of TNCs.  
Against this “hyperglobalization” school, Cerny argued that the state had never left, and 
instead had become a major actor in promoting and responding to the discourse of 
globalization
1
. His main argument was that the welfare state was indeed gradually 
disappearing, but instead of doing away with the state, it would transform itself into a 
“competition state” (Cerny 1997).  
 
He argued that “greater structural interpenetration of national economies’ had – in 
conjunction with ‘the more competitive, zero-sum world of [the] international recession’ that 
prevailed in the wake of the so-called oil crisis of the early-1970s – forced several changes in 
government policy to the fore”. In 1997, he outlined the changes in question as follows: 
“(1) a shift from macroeconomic to microeconomic interventionism, as reflected in both 
deregulation and industrial policy; (2) a shift in the focus of that interventionism from the 
development and maintenance of a range of ‘strategic’ or ‘basic’ economic activities in order 
to retain minimal economic self-sufficiency in key sectors to one of flexible response to 
                                                          
1 “Globalization cannot simply be verified empirically according to measurable criteria such as the convergence 
(or not) of corporate forms or social structures. Perhaps its most crucial feature is that it constitutes a discourse - 
and, increasingly, a hegemonic discourse which cuts across and gives meaning to the kinds of categories 
suggested above. In this sense, the spread of the discourse itself alters the a priori ideas and perceptions which 
people have of the empirical phenomena which they encounter; in so doing, it engenders strategies and tactics 
which in turn may restructure the game itself. With the erosion of old axioms, the concept of 
globalization is coming increasingly to shape the terms of the debate.” (Cerny 1997, 256)  
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competitive conditions in a range of diversified and rapidly evolving international 
marketplaces, i.e. the pursuit of ‘competitive advantage’ as distinct from ‘comparative 
advantage’; (3) an emphasis on the control of inflation and general neoliberal monetarism – 
supposedly translating into non-inflationary growth – as the touchstone of state economic 
management and interventionism; and (4) a shift in the focal point of party and governmental 
policies away from a general maximization of welfare within a nation (full employment, 
redistributive transfer payments and social service provision) to the promotion of enterprise, 
innovation and profitability in both private and public sectors.” (Fougner 2006, 167) 
He outlined three models of the competition state: the strong state “technocratic-dirigisme” 
(France, Japan); the orthodox neoliberal state (the US and the UK) and the neocorporatist 
model with its emphasis on social partnership (Germany, Sweden).  
Eventually the neoliberal model would become the model of competition state as others 
proved economically inefficient in the new political economic setting. (Fougner 2006, 167) 
Cerny thus described the difference between the welfare state and the competition state:  
“Rather than attempt to take certain economic activities out of the market, to ‘decommodify’ 
them as the welfare state was organized to do, the competition state has pursued increased 
marketization in order to make economic activities located within the national territory, 
or which otherwise contribute to national wealth, more competitive in international and 
transnational terms.” (Cerny 1997, 260) 
 
 
Nevertheless, as has been rightly pointed out by Fougner, the limit of the competition state 
approach is that it failed to demystify the imperative of international competitiveness, and 
observed the mutation of the state under what it treated as a real governmental problem. 
(Fougner 2006, 169) Fougner adds: “If it is the case, as Peter Dicken has claimed, that ‘[a]s 
long as the concept of national (. . .) competitiveness remains in currency then no single state 
is likely to opt out’, then a critical (re)problemisation of international competitiveness as a 
governmental problem might contribute to the required devaluation of the concept and, 
subsequently, to a de-competitivisation of the state.”(Fougner 2006, 169) 
Fougner brilliantly reconceives competitiveness as a problem of government, inspired by 
Foucaldian notion of governmentality; that is a problem of government. Competitiveness is 
not a fact of the social world that states need to respond to; rather it is posed as a 
governmental reality, a problem that states participate to create and thus treat as a tangible 
reality.  
What is essential to build is thus a genealogy of the notion of competitiveness and the way it 
emerged as a governmental problem. Changes in the international political economic setting 
of the late 1970s- early 1980s explain why competitiveness has gradually moved from the 
corporate realm to the national sphere per se. The discourse of global competitiveness is also 
sustained and nourished by a series of actors and publications that constantly work towards 
creating and reinforcing this governmental problem.  
State competitiveness had been discussed in international forums from the 1970s, but became 
a prominent issue in the 1980s with the publication of various reports and indexes evaluating 
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national competitiveness. In 1979, the European Management Forum published the first 
annual Global Competitiveness Report (EMF 1979). By the late 1980s, the World Economic 
Forum (former European Management Forum) published yearly reports which became a 
reference for national governments.  A whole literature developed and turned competitiveness 
into a governmental problem that different actors (business schools, government offices, think 
tanks, research institutes) took extremely seriously. Fougner notes that “international 
competitiveness was initially constituted as a governmental problem in the USA – this, in the 
context of a growing trade deficit and what was perceived to be the competitive challenge 
posed by Japan and other East Asian countries.”It then spread to Western Europe and is now 
the main preoccupation of most governments in developing countries too (Fougner 2006, 
170)
2
.  
 
Whereas competitiveness had been a concern of the corporate world, it came to be applied to 
a new object: the nation. National governments’ role was to change to adapt to this 
competitiveness imperative: they should remove all obstacles to industrial growth, withdraw 
their own means of intervention in the production to make their national companies more 
competitive. But also, beyond the international competitiveness of firms, global 
competitiveness meant that governments should use their governance abilities to make their 
nations attractive to footloose capital. (Fougner 2006, 172, 174) 
Fougner notes: “In accordance with this, the primary governmental problem on the part of 
state authorities is no longer to make firms more competitive, but to make the state itself 
more competitive – this, irrespective of how a so-called competitive state can subsequently be 
claimed to make firms located on its territory more competitive.” (Fougner 2006, 175) 
The state becomes “a flexible and manipulable market actor in and through the discourse on 
international competitiveness.” Its role becomes that of “selling the state as a location to 
globally footloose capital and firms.” (Fougner 2006, 180) and this reconstituting of the state 
as a market actor is carried out by numerous actors in different sites of power: international 
organizations (OECD, UNCTAD, regional development banks); institutions producing 
competitiveness bench marking such as the World Economic Forum; business scholars; 
consultancies and PR companies; individual companies; governmental bodies specializing in 
national competitiveness enhancements, investment promotion agencies and so forth. 
(Fougner 2006, 181) 
According to the competitiveness imperative, nations should now be branded in order to 
enhance their competitiveness and their attractiveness to mobile capital.  
Consequently, nation branding is now a major trend, one in which corporate and state 
interests are entrenched and have been “adopted in countries with emerging market 
economies and with established capitalist economies alike.” (Aronczyk 2013) 
I define nation branding as an apparatus of discourses and practices aiming to create a highly 
competitive national image in the global market place of nations. It uses corporate marketing 
                                                          
2
 As an example, the national competitiveness of the Philippines was created in 2006. The Nigerian 
competitiveness council was inaugurated in 2013. Almost all nations have created such institutions over the last 
two decades.  
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and brand management techniques and tools to convey a national image to be broadcast 
within and outside the nation. 
A successful nation brand is assumed to be able to compete for international capital: tourists, 
investment, import-export trade, skilled labor and highly educated international students; and 
foster national companies’ competitiveness. It helps “convey an image of legitimacy and 
authority in diplomatic arenas” (Aronczyk 2013) and obtain a legitimate seat in multilateral 
negotiations and decision-making. 
 
Let me briefly recall how the practice of nation branding gained prominence. Historically, the 
shift from industrial to service society and from production to consumption in the second half 
of the twentieth century led to the emergence of brands, intangible assets representing the 
intangible value of corporations.  
In the 1980s, corporations began to “rely on intangible assets as measures of corporate value” 
(Aronczyk 2013). It corresponded to a new methodology of value assertion by corporations’ 
CEOs. Brand management became the major field of expertise in the corporate world. 
Branding consultancies started to appear, working on the measurement and improvement of 
corporate brands, which represented the ultimate means to evaluate a company’s success on 
the market. These consultancies created rankings, best practices and optimum criteria to 
which companies should comply. Most companies consulting on nation branding issues today 
were originally corporate branding consultancies.  
In the 1990s, a “postmodern branding revolution” took place and advertising, marketing and 
public relations (PR) became fundamental disciplines and fields of practice. For Jansen, the 
shift from conventional advertising and marketing occurred when the brand itself and its logo 
became “the focus of conventional efforts. Indeed postmodern branding does not even require 
a tangible product.” (Jansen 2008) 
  
In the 1990s, the emergence of brands met the growing concern about national reputation, in a 
world where national governments started to be aware of different forms of power, especially 
with the much debated American soft power (Nye 1990). 
Branding, a tool of quality and distinctiveness measurement designed for companies, “started 
to be considered the most legitimate way to make the nation matter in a global 
context.”(Jansen 208, 30) 
As it had been, for corporations, a way to differentiate one another and acquire legitimacy in 
the eyes of consumers, nation branding became a way for nations to obtain and secure 
legitimacy on the global scene, a legitimacy that had seemed to be threatened by the post-
Cold War period and the narrative of globalization which predicted the “obsolescence of the 
State”.   
 
Then, the nation brand became, according to nation branding consultant Simon Anholt, “a 
clear and simple measure of a country’s “license to trade” in the global marketplace and the 
acceptability of its people, hospitality, culture, policies, products and services to the rest of the 
world. The only sort of government that can afford to ignore the impact of its national 
7 
 
reputation […] its citizens to benefit from the rich influences and opportunities that the rest of 
the world offers them.” (Anholt 2010) 
Not only did nation branding appear as a way to restore nations’ threatened legitimacy, it was 
also a response to the introduction of the neoliberal concept of competitiveness into the 
national realm.  
When I interviewed nation branding consultants and asked why they considered they work as 
necessary, their answers invariably evoked the “force” of globalization and competitiveness: 
 
“ -  Why do you think countries should be competitive today and more than before? 
 
- I guess globalization has been increasing for some decades and so that’s a driving 
wind to the need to compete as a nation, that increases the pressure to be competitive 
and increases the need to raise your profile.” (personal interview, 2014) 
 
Together with articles and books describing and justifying the practice of nation branding, 
nation branders have also created indexes, benchmarking tools to measure the 
competitiveness of nation brands and the elements composing the nation brands. Among 
these, the Anholt-GfK  Nation Brands Index  is an annual index measuring the nation brands 
of 50 countries in the fields of exports, governance, culture, people, tourism , immigration and 
investment.
3
 
 
The first nation to implement nation branding programs was Spain after the death of Franco 
and the democratic transition. It is widely considered as a success for nation branding 
(Gilmore 2002). After Spain, the Irish Republic’s young European campaign, and the Cool 
Britannia campaign followed, opening the growing list of nations which turned to nation 
branding consultancies in the 1990s and the 2000s.  
 
 
 
* 
In 2010, Cerny updated the notion of “competition state” with a shift from raison d’état to 
what he calls raison du monde. (Cerny 2010) What guides state actors is not traditional raison 
d’état (conservation of the state) but raison du monde, the imperative of competitiveness. He 
states that the competition is something slightly different from the neo-liberal state in that it 
bears a distinctively global character, with “the state as a (the?) key promoter of globalisation 
and therefore of global competition as the primary requirement for the achievement of 
economic growth for all states (in principle, at least), enabling the development of pro-market 
social policies too (Evans and Cerny 2004).” He adds that “This competitive raison du Monde 
has become the hegemonic paradigm for major political actors”. (Cerny 2010, 8) 
The competition states is thus an essential actor in the enacting of the discourse of 
globalization which presents global competition as the only way to attain growth. Not only is 
                                                          
3
 http://www.gfk.com/news-and-events/press-room/press-releases/pages/nation-brand-index-2013-latest-
findings.aspx; For more indexes, see also http://www.brandfinance.com/knowledge_centre/reports/brandfinance-
nation-brands-2013  
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the state an agent in this discursive formation, it also enables it to be self-fulfilled, by taking 
measures to enhance national competitiveness. Thus the state is far from being solely a victim 
of globalization; it is its major agent, in constantly reproducing and adhering to this 
hegemonic “raison du monde.”  
 
If we give a closer look at Foucaldian neoliberal governmentality, the phenomenon is made 
bright clear. Cerny relies on Foucault to show how competition is not a given social fact, but 
rather the result of a political program, a program of government: “ [The first principle of this 
revolution within liberal governmentality is] a shift from exchange to competition as the 
principle of the market . . . ; the problem of competition and monopoly is much more 
[important for the success of capitalism] than that of value and equivalence. [However], 
competition is not the result of a natural interplay of appetites, instincts, behavior, and so on. 
(Foucault 2008, 116-120) 
. . . pure competition is not a primitive given. It can only be the result of lengthy efforts 
and, in truth, pure competition is never obtained. Pure competition must and can only 
be an objective, an objective thus presupposing an indefinitely active policy. Competition 
is therefore an historical objective of governmental art and not a natural given that 
must be respected . . . There will thus be a sort of complete superimposition of market 
mechanisms, indexed to competition, and governmental policy. Government must 
accompany the market from start to finish. (Foucault 2008, 120-121; my emphasis) 
 
Indeed, when bringing to the fore the concept of “competitiveness society”, I explicitly 
ground the notion in Foucaldian critique.  
In The Birth of Biopolitics, a lecture given at the Collège de France in 1979, Foucault 
establishes the genealogy of neoliberalism thanks to the concept of governmentality with 
which he examines the emergence and tenets of neoliberalism (Foucault 2004). He treats 
neoliberalism “not just as ideological rhetoric […] but above all as a political project that 
endeavours to create a social reality that it suggests already exists.” (Lemke 2002, 60) Thus, 
the discourse of neoliberalism serves as a reservoir of political practices that constitute a 
reality which it claims to be responding to, it almost appears, like competitiveness, as a self-
fulfilling prophecy.  
In his 17th February 1979 lecture, Foucault shows how the market works as a site of truth 
(“lieu de véridiction”) (Foucault 2004), a rational space in which government should not 
intervene, although neoliberalism does attribute a role to government: that of setting rules to 
protect the independent work of the market. The role of government is minimized but not 
absent. Whereas in former political configurations the market was subordinated to 
government, in the neoliberal society the market dominates government.
4
 
                                                          
4
 “Unlike the state in the classical liberal notion of rationality, for the neo-liberals the state does not define and 
monitor market freedom, for the market is itself the organizing and regulative principle underlying the state. 
From this angle, it is more the case of the state being controlled by the market than of the market being 
supervised by the state. Neo-liberalism removes the limiting, external principle and puts a regulatory and inner 
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Foucault also comments that « The problem of neoliberalism is to […] know how to manage 
the global exercise of political power on the principles of a market economy.”  (Foucault 2004, 
137, my translation) He talks about an “economic tribunal” that is constantly judging and 
critically reviewing the actions of government, evaluating them according to the principles of 
market society. (Foucault 2004, 252) 
The first aim of the neoliberal program of government is thus the subjection of the realm of 
government to the scrutiny of the market, understood as a source of perfect rationality and 
truth.  
The second issue of neoliberalism is then to diffuse the “form of the company” to all social 
objects. Foucault argues that “it is about turning market, competition, and consequently firm, 
into what we could call the informing force of society.” (Foucault 2004, 252) Competition and 
entrepreneurship are generalized and become the grid of intelligibility, the principle of 
analysis according to which the social sphere can be understood. Social relations and 
individual behaviors are then to be understood through the prism of market rationality, 
gradually transforming each nation into a “competitiveness society”.  
 
Building a first world society in Korea: origins and path dependency of the ideology of 
competitiveness (1960-2000s) 
From the early 1960s, the South Korean state founded its legitimacy (albeit contested) in its 
developmental character. The “miraculous” development of the peninsula has been acclaimed 
by various international organizations (most notably, by the World Bank 1993) and a wide 
body of literature (for instance: Amsden 1989) which resolves around a debate on the role of 
the state in this developmental success. The prevailing explanation for this success from the 
late 1980s emphasizes the overwhelming role of the state in efficiently managing market 
forces (Chang 2006), and has been labeled the developmental state explanation.  
General Park Chung-Hee took power in 1961 and justified his military coup by the 
developmental project he advocated: transforming South Korea into an independent and 
strong nation state, both militarily and economically (Kim, 2004). What is over overlooked, or 
taken for granted, is the ideological underpinning of such a national project. As Lie noted (Lie 
1998, 147), “The crucial underpinning of South Korean state nationalism was the celebration 
of GNP growth.” His project of modernization of the fatherland, Jokuk Kundaewha, 
“envisioned a world of nation-states that were in fierce competition with one another and 
were ranked hierarchically. His rhetoric of “modernization” and “catch-up’ suggests that 
the kundaewha discourse accepted Korea’s low status in the hierarchy of nation-states and the 
West’s position at the top” (Kim, 2014, 4). The catch phrase of the kundaehwa discourse is 
revealing of the pro-growth, proudly capitalist project that Park envisioned for his country: 
“jal sara boshe” (Let’s have a rich life!).  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
principle in its place: it is the market form which serves as the organizational principle for the state and society” 
(Foucault 2004, lecture 7 February 1979, p.120, my translation) 
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In the process of making Korea change “from a pre-modern, underdeveloped society to a 
modern, productive, constantly growing society” (Park Chung-Hee, quoted in Lie 1998, 43), 
Park Chung-Hee’s authoritarian leadership relied on the sacrifice of a repressed labor force, 
enrolled in the developmental project to provide cheap manpower for the ambitious 
industrialization programs he set up. South Korean citizens were notably made to participate 
in national development through the New Village Movement (Saemaul Undong), a 
developmental program targeting rural areas. 
The democratization process took place after the 1987 protests forced President Chun Doo-
Hwan to abandon the authoritarian system. The first democratically elected President Roo 
Mu-Hyun maintained concerns of designing a central place to South Korea, with the Donduka 
Jungsim Gugka doctrine, aimed at making of South Korea “the center of North East Asia”. 
 
The election of President Kim Young-Sam in 1992 is considered as a turning point in Korea’s 
engagement with globalization. The new government adopted a new foreign policy 
paradigm, segyehwa (“globalization policy”).  
The core objective of segyehwa was to “become a central country to the world” (Segyehwa 
White Paper 1998) and an advantaged nation. More than adapting to globalization, Kim 
emphasized the need to adopt globalization as a state policy.(Segyehwa White Paper 
1998) Segyehwa was born out of a “recognition of a move from the periphery to the core” 
(Segyehwa White Paper 1998) and a worldview in which globalization could be “a shortcut 
that will lead us [South Korea] to building a first-class country in the 21
st
 century” (Kim 
Young-sam 1995, New Year’s address, January). 
The new democratic regime, pro-business, accepted the principle of economic liberalization 
of the country. From the late 1980s, Korean chaebols began acquiring more and more 
autonomy as the developmental state was steadily dismantled. The relation between state and 
chaebols moved “from a dominating/subordinating relation to symbiotic and collaborationist 
relations.”  (Kim 2008, 236) Kim Young-Sam led the opening of the South Korean financial 
sector to foreign companies, with the goal of entering the OECD. Despite a fierce opposition 
to this membership by protest groups (such as the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice), 
South Korea joined the WTO in 1995 and the OECD in 1996. Although many observers 
claimed that the country was ill-prepared to liberalize its economy and follow the standards of 
the OECD, Mimiko notes that “The desire to be in synergy with the developed Western 
market economies was one of the great issues that propelled Seoul into the OECD” since “the 
process of globalization involves greater liberalization of the economy or what former 
President Kim referred to as making it “look more like the West”.”  (Mimiko 2002, 71)  
The segyehwa policy intrinsically associated globalization and competitiveness, and it was 
presented as the best way for Korea to regain and maintain international competitiveness in a 
changing global economic environment. Following democratization, wages in the country had 
increased significantly and labor seemed to exit from its position of developmental industrial 
army, decreasing the appeal of South Korea as a cheap manpower destination for TNCs. The 
privileged access to the US market that Korean products had enjoyed had also come to an end, 
and Korea was under diplomatic pressure from the US to stop cheating the laws of free 
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market and abandon the protectionist policies that had characterized the developmental state 
period. Kim Young-Sam responded to these pressures but “Ironically, Korea’s segyehwa 
campaign was initiated by the state independent of the Western world’s more conventional 
interpretation of globalization, with its emphasis on an inexorable demise and irrelevance of 
the territorial nation-state.” (Kim 2000, 3) 
As noted by Kim, “Under Kim Young-Sam administration, Korean development adopted the 
style of a competition state, with focus on marketization and commodification of the state 
indicating: a shift from macroeconomic to microeconomic interventionism, embodied in both 
deregulation and industrial policy; the pursuit of competitive advantage; a commitment to the 
promotion of enterprise, innovation and profitability in both the private and public sectors.” 
(Kim 2008, 211) He argues that Segyehwa was the turning point in transforming the 
developmental state instituted by Park Chung-Hee into a competition state ready to compete 
in an era of boundless competition.  
Segyehwa was a society-wide response to what Kim Young-Sam administration perceived as 
the necessity to “globalize or perish” (Kim 2000, 2) Engaging with globalization was 
understood as a way to avoid what Kim Young-Sam saw as the mistakes of the past, when 
Korea had been opened by force by foreign powers and subsequently colonized. Globalizing 
Korea meant enhancing Korean competitiveness 
5
 in all sectors of society. Indeed, in an 
address to the nation on the 6
th
 of January 1995, Kim Young-sam declared that segyehwa “is 
aimed at realizing globalization in all sectors- politics, foreign affairs; economy, society, 
culture and sports. To this end, it is necessary to enhance our viewpoints, ways of thinking, 
system and practices to the world class level… We have no choice other than this.” (Kim 
2000, 1)   
Just as Park’s developmental project had aimed at creating a new Korean society along the 
lines of capitalist social subjectivity, and had consequently reformed every aspect of life in 
Korea, Segyehwa was not restricted to the economic realm. Not only were Korean companies 
to be made more competitive, and Korea a place to invest and visit. All spheres of society 
were to be transformed under the imperative of global competitiveness.  
 “[Segyehwa] meant a sweeping transformation of society requiring productivity and 
flexibility in all areas of national life. Segyehwa included economic reform to meet global 
standards of practice (including transparency of all transactions, fair competition, deregulation 
of the financial sector and a fairer tax system); industrial relations reform, expansion of the 
social security system; political reform towards a more open competitive system; 
administrative reform.” (Kim 2000, 38) 
As stated by the Korean embassy in Washington when segyehwa was launched “under the 
globalization program, all sectors of socio-political, economic, social and cultural were to 
become competitive at the international level.” (Kim 2000, 107) 
                                                          
5
 Sydney Declaration 17 November 1994 “New Diplomacy” under Foreign Minister Han Sung Joo for whom 
“best mean of melting the challenge of globalization was to enhance competitiveness.” (Kim 2000, 37) 
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Segyehwa would rationalize all aspects of life; maintain national unity by rising above class, 
regional and generational differences; strengthen Korean identity as basis for successful 
globalization; enhance a sense of community with all humanity. This would be done through 
reforming education; legal and economic systems (to match global standards of excellence); 
politics and the press; national and local governments; environmental policies; Korean culture 
and consciousness. A Presidential Segyehwa Promotion Committee was established to carry 
out and supervise the necessary reforms.  
Although the substance of segyehwa was evaluated quite poorly by observers (Kim 2000), 
what is striking is how the imperative of competitiveness that had become hegemonic at the 
international level was translated into a set of reforms and everyday social practices in Korea, 
through legal reforms and mass mobilization campaigns. “The stage thus set for the world 
game to be played out in the politics of everyday life in South Korea during much of the Kim 
Young-Sam administration.” (Kim 2000, 244) 
 
Although Kim Young-Sam was a democrat and had been an opponent to the military regime, 
the path-dependency with the Park era underlying segyehwa should not be missed. Indeed, as 
Kim Nora notes, “Recall that Park saw the world as a place in which nation-states compete 
against one another and envisioned kundaehwa as a strategy to survive such fierce 
competition. Kim Young-Sam promoted a similar sense of vulnerability and crisis. At the 
Seattle Summit conference on APEC in November 1993, he declared the beginning of 
his segyehwa drive, with which Korea “should prepare for the coming 21stcentury, an era of 
unlimited competition, by planning survival strategy of internalization equipped with the 
supreme competitiveness of the whole world” (Kang 2000, 448). 
The model to be emulated was that of “more affluent Western [states]” (Moon 2005, p.110) 
and the government emphasized the adoption of international norms and standards. As Kim 
points out, “As Korea repositions itself from the bottom to the middle and aspires to be a top 
country, conforming to Western norms has become an important component of developmental 
strategies”. (Kim, 2014, 4) Mass mobilization of citizens was considered essential to the 
accomplishment of segyehwa, in order for globalization to reach out to every aspect of the 
social realm in South Korea (Kim 2014). 
 
Kim Young-Sam’s successors, Kim Dae -Jung and Lee Myung-Bak, although belonging to 
opposed political sympathies, continued to emphasize the centrality of globalization in the 
modern development of Korea, again relating to an understanding of world order in which 
survival is the key driving force of government policies. This was manifested in the 
continuation of neoliberal policies, especially following the IMF bailout plan accepted by 
Kim Dae-Jung in 1997, and the urging of Koreans to “globalize” (Kalinowski and Cho 2012). 
In December 1997, Kim Dae-jung, a democratic opposition activist, succeeded to Kim 
Young-sam. Although he is most recorded for his Sunshine Policy with North Korea, Kim 
Dae-jung, like his predecessor, also considered globalization to be crucial for South Korean 
foreign policy. He “saw globalization as in no way restricted to the economy”(Kim 1999b) 
and launched the slogan “Parallel development of democracy and market economy”. His aim 
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was to make every citizen a global citizen, arguing that the country could only progress if it 
participated in globalization and “embraced the challenges of the new millennium.(Kim 
1999a)”  
The 2000s decade was then marked by a series of events that confirmed this policy line: in 
2002, South Korea held the first Football World Cup in Asia. In February 2004, the South 
Korean National Assembly approved the controversial dispatch of 3,000 troops to Iraq along 
the US army. In October 2006, Ban Ki-moon was appointed as UN’s new secretary general.  
Globalization was, for Kim Dae-jung as it had been for Kim Young-sam, a way to “join the 
ranks of first-rate societies.” (Kim 1999a) 
This policy line culminated in conservative President Lee Myung-Bak “Global Korea” policy. 
Branding South Korea 
In May 2006, Simon Anholt, “inventor” of nation branding, was the key note speaker at the 
“Nation Brands in the Global Market” conference in Seoul, held by the Korea Image 
Development Committee. He addressed the question of South Korean global reputation and 
advised the South Korean government on these issues. It is not surprising that two of the most 
active promoters of nation branding, Simon Anholt and Keith Dinnie, have worked on the 
South Korean case (Dinnie 2010, Anholt 2011). South Korea is indeed one of the countries, if 
not the only country in the world, which has put so much effort in its nation branding strategy. 
I argue that South Korean nation branding cannot be understood without considering the 
perspective of South Korean capitalist development initiated by General Park Chung Hee in 
the early 1960s. Successive South Korean governments have aimed at making South Korea a 
leading nation, a “top country” (Kim 2014, 4). I argue that South Korean nation branding is 
both a domestic and global exercise, aiming at completing the state-led development project 
launched by Park Chung-Hee. The different policies aimed at transforming South Korea into a 
first-class capitalist country share similar features of a constant state-led project. Nation 
branding can be analyzed as the final step towards the global recognition of South Korea as a 
fully competitive and globalized (understand: successfully capitalist) state. 
At the heart of President Lee Myung-bak’s “Global Korea”, the concern for South Korean 
global image met the phenomenon of nation branding. Like his predecessors, Lee Myung-bak 
and his administration were convinced that “South Korea must globalize in order to survive 
global competition.” (Lee 2008, 4) Lee promoted a more active global role for South Korea. 
In 2009, he deployed South Korean troops to Afghanistan, after a true effort to convince a 
hostile South Korean public opinion. On the 1
st
 July 2011, the EU-ROK Free Trade 
Agreement entered into force and in June 2012 the KORUS FTA with the United States was 
signed, after six years of negotiation and great protest in South Korea. In November 2010, 
South Korea hosted the G20 Summit. In March 2012, South Korea hosted the 2012 Nuclear 
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Security Summit.  The “global” lexicon is omnipresent in the documents issued by the South 
Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs.
6
  
 
In his 2008 Liberation Day speech, Lee declared: “it is extremely important for Koreans to 
win the respect of the international community. […] Korea is one of the most technologically 
advanced nations. And yet, the first images coming to the minds of foreigners are strikes and 
street demonstrations. If our nation wants to be “approved” as an advanced country, then it 
[…] needs to improve its image and its reputation significantly.”(Lee 2008)  Lee Myung-Bak, 
former Hyundai Heavy Construction CEO and mayor of Seoul, took nation branding “guru” 
(Aronczyk 2013) Simon Anholt’s comments on South Korean nation brand’s poor scores very 
seriously. The concern was focused on the so-called “Korea Discount” phenomenon, referring 
to the gap between the country’s development accomplishments and its poor image in the 
eyes of international audiences. 
Therefore,  Lee Myung-bak consulted Mc Kinsey and Company in 2008 to define the role a 
nation branding council would play, and on the 22
nd
 January 2009, he launched the 
Presidential council on Nation Branding (guka burandu wiwonhoe). Thanks to the Council, 
his objective was to climb from 33
rd
 to 15
th
 rank in the Anholt-GfK Ropers Nation Brands 
Index, as early as 2013.  
 
As branding advocate Dinnie observed, “the government has committed significant resources 
and energy to position the Korea Brand as a vibrant, dynamic democracy, creative and open to 
the world.”(Dinnie 2010)  These attributes correspond to the standards of global normalcy 
countries attempt to comply with thanks to nation branding.  
 
The Council’s main objectives were “to increase Korea’s commitment and contribution to the 
international community; to help Koreans become responsible, respectful global citizens; and 
to promote Korean products and services.” (Lee 2010) It was composed of 47 members, of 
which 13 were government officials and 34 were civilians, mostly from the academic and 
private sector
. 
(Kim 2011) 24 international advisors also sat on five different committees: 
planning, international cooperation, business and IT, culture and tourism, and global 
citizenship. The chairman was appointed by President Lee. A 100 billion won (74 million 
dollars) fund was allocated to implement branding campaigns in Korea and abroad. (Lee 2008) 
 
In March 2009, the PCNB presented a plan for action in 10 axes, among which aims are to 
increase the Korean presence on the development agenda, to foster international academic 
exchanges, and to make every Korean a global citizen by promoting multiculturalism in the 
country. 
 
In the 2011 Anholt-GfK Ropers Nations Brands Index, Korea ranked 27
th
 (compared to 33
rd
 
in 2008) and its rank was in constant rise
7
.  
                                                          
6
 In a document dating from 2010 and entitled “Global Korea”, I isolated 14 occurrences of the word “global” or 
“international” in 6 pages, see MOFA of the Republic of Korea (2010),글로벌코리아[Global Korea] 
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The PCNB has not been the only actor to participate in the nation branding effort. The private 
sector was also involved in the nation branding strategy, whether it was the business sector
 
(Choi 2014) or the entertainment industry
 
(Kim 2011). Local governments also participated in 
the branding operation. The Seoul Metropolitan government, under Lee Myung-bak’s term as 
mayor of Seoul, also launched a 100 million dollar “Global Seoul” campaign (Williamson 
2012), starting before the PCNB was created. An operation such as the restoration of 
Cheonggyecheon stream was a striking example of the symbolic reconstruction aimed at 
adapting Seoul to the growing competitiveness imperative among world cities (Blaz 2011). 
The Seoul Metropolitan Government aimed at presenting a “clean and attractive global Seoul” 
(Seoul Metropolitan Government 2006, 26) and Lee Myung-bak’s successor consulted Simon 
Anholt and Christopher Forbes on his city branding strategy. The problem of competitiveness 
to which South Korean nation branding responded thus worked at several political levels.  
In November 2010, South Korea presided and hosted the 5
th
 G20 Summit. President Lee 
Myung-decided to take advantage of the Summit to boost Korea’s nation brand in foreign 
audiences: “Korea should take advantage of the event to become a more respected and 
powerful nation. It will be a good opportunity, too, to upgrade global awareness about 
Korea’s potential as well as the remarkable achievements the nation has made during the past 
decades”. (Na 2009a) As member of the PCNB Suh Dae-won noted, since South Korea is 
“now aiming to become one of the most advanced nations, [it] should confidently display 
courage and determination to think beyond its borders and accept and implement international 
standards” (Suh 2009). South Koreans should also “learn globally accepted norms and 
etiquette and have an international mind-set.” (Na 2009b) 
The PCNB drew a list of goals for the summit, among which: organizing forums of student 
leaders from the G20 countries, creating self-promotional ads to be shown on international 
media such as BBC and CNN, promoting Korean culture and food to foreigners, and 
broadcasting contents easily accessible about Korean culture. 
As one foreigner commentator noted (personal interview 2014), “The country was mobilized 
to avoid any wrong chord. It came from the top; it was a big thing for Lee Myung-bak. It was 
a source of pride for his term.” 
According to a Korean interviewee, “Because of the Summit, Koreans were disturbed in their 
daily lives.” Boards reading “If you come across a foreigner, smile and say “Hello!” were 
posted in the capital’s subway. Other boards asked South Koreans to behave well towards the 
foreign visitors excepted in Seoul for the Summit. “G20” was the key term before the summit: 
it appeared on newspapers, official speeches, ads, and policemen’s uniforms.” (personal 
interview 2014) 
While the foreign heads of states were taken on a tour around the country, Seoul’s mayor took 
drastic measures to present a clean and modern capital. The streets were cleaned, street 
vendors and homeless asked to leave the city centre, for they did not fit in the image of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
7
 http://www.simonanholt.com/Publications/publications-other-articles.aspx 
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“global city”. Taxi drivers were obliged to attend English classes and shave every day. Other 
operations aimed at reducing traffic in the city, and present an efficiently working, ordered 
city (personal interview 2014). The anti-G20 local demonstrators were harshly repressed by 
the police, largely deployed in Seoul, and the army. International activists were refused entry 
visa. Despite these security measures, the protests were fierce against the Summit, but not 
emphasized by the Korean media, for they did not fit in the consensual South Korean nation 
brand. 
I argue that South Korean nation branding should be understood within the context of 
reinventing South Korea as a site of capitalist accumulation in a global competitive setting 
(Pirie 2008). Pres. Lee’s nation branding strategy shares common features with previous 
forms of the developmental project: a strong top-down, state-led character, a sense of 
vulnerability and crisis facing South Korea (see Kim 2014), and the same concern with the 
global recognition of South Korea as a competitive state. The way nation branding is 
imposing on the citizens to participate in “living the brand” (Aronczyk 2008) also recalls 
earlier mass mobilization of citizens in the developmental project, and gives hint on how all 
spheres of Korean society have become subjected to the imperative of competitiveness.  
South Korean nation branding is one of the last steps in the project of creating modern Korea 
as a strong player in the game of restless international competitiveness. In 2013, newly 
elected President Park Geun-hye decided to dissolve the Council, mainly because it has been 
the target of much criticism by foreign observers. But it seems likely that current President 
Park Geun-Hye, although she denied this to the PCNB, is working in the same direction. Her 
promotion of a creative economy and the current praise of multiculturalism are elements of 
the broader strategy for Korea to survive in what is perceived as the late-modern zero-sum 
game of global competitiveness. Nation branding is one but the only element that puts Korea 
in a privileged place to be qualified of “competitiveness society”. 
The imperative of competitiveness in labor regulations and development diplomacy 
But nation branding is not the only governmental response to the problem of global 
competitiveness. Responses such as market liberalization measures (see Pirie 2007), labor 
market flexibility and competitive development diplomacy are also characteristic of a shift 
towards competitiveness in different sectors of Korean politics.   
The situation of labor within Korea has constantly been a mirror of the evolution and 
contradictions of Korean capitalist development.  
While under the military dictatorship, labor was harshly repressed and Korea probably had 
one of the worst labor conditions in the world, improvements seemed to have been reached, or 
at least, possible, after the collapse of the military regime in 1987. This hope was short-lived. 
Newly elected President Kim Young-sam, as part of his segyehwa policy, started opening up 
the economy and took the first step in a series of decisions that would lead Korea to be a neo-
liberal state by the end of the 2000s (Pirie 2007). Labour has indeed been placed under the 
imperative of global competitiveness, and is bearing the consequences of this national shift 
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towards neoliberal competitive society. Indeed, as noted by Gray, South Korea has been 
directed “towards a bourgeois hegemony and the costs of competitiveness shifted from capital 
to labour’ (Gray 2011, 2). He explains the context in which this transformation took place: 
“Korean policy makers willingly adopted neoliberal policies to maintain the country’s 
position as a site of capital accumulation amidst the dual nature of these challenges emanating 
both from changes at the level of geopolitics [changing role of US in Asia: imposition of 
neoliberal policies] and at the level of the underlying social relations of production [rise of a 
strong society].” (Gray 2011, 2) 
Government and the corporate world came together by viewing “globalization not only in the 
given context of irresistible worldwide economic integration, but also an imperative for 
economic reforms to enhance national competitiveness under the growing competition of 
global markets.” This has dramatically hindered the potential for labor resistance that 
democratization seemed to open up.  (Chang, Seok and Baker 2015, 183) 
Indeed, as noted by Pirie, “Globalization produced paradoxical outcomes for South Korean 
workers. Globalization significantly improved the domestic and international status of Korean 
workers by facilitating the formation of transnational coalitions with international labor 
organizations. But the costs outweighed the benefits. In the age of waning international 
competitiveness, the logic of globalization provided the government and business with 
powerful ideological and institutional weapons to restrain labour. And fear of lay-offs, erosion 
of labour’s internal cohesion, and threats to wage and job security emerged as inevitable 
consequences of globalization.” (Pirie 2007, 61) 
South Korean labor, after having been brutally repressed by the authoritarian regime until the 
late 1980s (Hart-Landsberg, 1993), organized itself and became major social component of 
the minjung (“people”) movement, which led to the fall of the military regime in 1987. But 
the parallel shift to democracy and neoliberal policies hindered its organizative force and led 
to a renewed exploitation of workers for South Korea to fit in the new global competitiveness 
race.  
In 1996, the government began reforming the existing labor laws through tripartite 
consultation with workers and business. These consultations were eventually to promote labor 
market flexibility, seen as necessary to enhance national competitiveness. The OECD 
membership also made labor market flexibility central to Kim Young-Sam administration. 
The same year, Kim announced his Grand Idea for New Industrial Relations and formed the 
Presidential Commission on Industrial Relations Reform, “in order to reshape labor relations 
in the new era of globalization and information society” (Chang, Seok and Baker 2015, 184). 
The Commission led the revision of the labor laws by reaching a compromise between the 
demands of capital and labor. The revised Labor Standards Act (LSA) opened up new lay-off 
procedures, as well as flexible and selective working hour system. To compensate for this 
higher flexibility of labor, the new Labour Union Act brought Korean labour unions’ rights to 
the level of international labor standards by cancelling the “anti-union provisions that 
prohibited multiple union organizations, third party involvement and unions’ political 
activity”. (Chang Seok and Baker 2015, 185-185) 
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The presidency of Kim Dae-Jung was marked by the1997 crisis and a deepening of the 
neoliberalization of South Korea. The IMF agreement for Korean bailout plan required that 
labor laws should be changed to meet with the organization’s emphasis on labor flexibility. 
The Kim Dae-Jung administration complied with the IMF exigencies. It amended the LSA to 
put the lay-off provision into effect and enacted the Dispatched Workers Protection Act in 
February 1998. Again, to compensate for this loss of labor protection, it guaranteed that civil 
servants’ work councils and teachers ‘unions could be established in 1999. (Chang, Seok and 
Baker 2015, 185) 
Market requirements and rationality came to rule labor conditions in Korea. “As such, 
globalization and more significantly, the economic crisis which placed labour unions into a 
defensive position, laid down favorable conditions for enabling employers to introduce a 
performance-based personnel system, and more closely linked workers’ wages and 
employment to market situations.” (Chang, Seok and Baker 2015, 189) 
As underlined by Dae-oup Chang, irregular unemployment has risen dramatically from the 
early 1990s, and especially after the 1997 crisis when the Kim Dae-jung government accepted 
the IMF bailout plan. The rate of irregular employment out of total employment in South 
Korea rose from 41% in 1996 to 52% in 2001 and 49% in 2003. This was also accompanied 
by a growing portion of workers engaged in non employed capitalist work like private 
tutoring , and the increase in the number of migrant workers in South Korea(around 400 000 
from 95 countries in 2004).  
Pirie notes that exploitation of Korean labor has been intensifying, especially since the 1997 
crisis. The proportion of unprotected labor has increased, as flexibility has become the new 
imperative of Korean business human resources policy. (Pirie 2007, 183) The competition 
imperative has also led to changes in the attribution of wages: while traditionally salary was 
based on seniority, it became indexed on achievement, transforming the working environment 
into a sphere of constant competition. (Yi 2002) Indeed, “Korean labor relations, confronted 
with ever growing challenges from the globalizing circumstance, have entered into an era of 
uncertainty, in that the terrain of labor relations embraces complex and contentious interplays, 
involving domestic and overseas actors under the context of globalization.” (Chang, Seok and 
Baker 2015, 194) 
These trends have hindered the capacity of South Korean labor to organize itself as it had 
during the industrialization period, and the democratic trend towards consensus and tripartism 
has further endangered the capacity of Korean labor to look for alternative visions of society. 
Indeed, as Chang sums it up as to the organizing principle of contemporary Korean society, 
“ the logic of capital is incarnated in individual workers laboring for capital in and outside the 
factory, permeating into once solidarity-seeking relations between workers. After ten years of 
transition, capital became society while society continuously defines itself according to the 
logic of profit-making.” (Chang 2007, 236) Pirie concludes “The purpose of these changes is 
to tighten the hegemony of capital over labour and to enhance international competitiveness.” 
(Pirie 2007, 182) 
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Although “the essentially neo-liberal nature of the labour market reform process in Korea” is 
undisputable (Pirie 2007), the path dependency of labor conditions in Korea should not be 
underestimated. Korean labor was under the imperative of building a first-rate, independent 
and modern nation under Park regime. It became a massive industrial army at the service of 
Park’s export-oriented industrialization program. Contemporary labor restructuring should be 
seen in the same light: while Korea was to be a modern industrial society up to the 1980s, and 
Korean products were to compete in the international economy, Korea is now to become a 
competitive society, and Korean workers are to be competitive players in the global labor 
market. (see Pirie 2007, 195) The initiative of President Park Geun-hye to make Korea a 
“creative economy” is but an additional step in this process: Koreans are now urged to 
become creative entrepreneurs. In the competitive society, as in Foucaldian neoliberal 
governmentality, entrepreneurship is the new modality governing the social world.  
 
* 
Competitiveness also influences South Korean diplomacy, especially under Lee Myung-bak 
and his successor Park Geun-hye. The field of international development cooperation tends to 
appear as a space of competition, and South Korea is building itself a favorable position in the 
marketplace of development models and advocacies.  
 
In January 2012, Simon Anholt told BBC journalist Lucy Williamson that South Korean 
initiatives in development aid policy were more likely to improve South Korean nation brand 
and make the nation “relevant” to foreigners. (Williamson 2012) It may seem that the South 
Korean government has followed Anholt’s notion of competitive identity (Anholt 2007), in 
which a nation’s image can be enhanced not through communication campaigns but through 
policies
.
 Anholt also favours the use of corporate social responsibility applied to countries. 
The South Korean active aid policy is an example of this national social responsibility.  
 
From 1995, South Korea was removed from the World Bank list of aid recipient countries and 
became an aid donor. From the 2000s, it has increased its commitment to development 
cooperation, with a clear geographical focus on Southeast Asia, with key target countries such 
as Vietnam, the Philippines, Cambodia, Indonesia and Myanmar
8
, as well as a growing 
commitment to development in Africa.  
South Korean experience of being a “recipient-turned-donor country in terms of international 
aid” (Lee M-B 2010) makes it more legitimate than other developed countries to take part in 
global discussions on development.  As Lee Myung-bak put it in Davos before the Seoul G20 
Summit:  “Korea will play a role of bridging between developed and developing countries. At 
the November Seoul Summit, we will place development issues firmly on the agenda, and 
work toward finding agreement. As you know, Korea is a member of the OECD grouping of 
developed countries, but it is also a country with first-hand experience of economic 
development within living memory. As a country that has made the transition from one that 
                                                          
8
 See http://www.koica.go.kr/english/countries/region_asia/index.html [accessed 12/03/2015] 
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receives aid to one that gives aid, we understand well what is involved in making aid work. 
[…] I believe that Korea is well-placed to share its experiences and expertise with emerging 
and developing countries on strategies for development and on policies for successful 
recovery from financial crises.” (Lee M-B 2010) 
 
Development cooperation is defined by the South Korean MOFA as a central asset of Global 
Korea brand.
9
 Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations followed the same political 
line, that of a “mature and responsible middle power” which, after attaining the status of 
“developed country”, is now ready to pay its debt back to the international community and 
comply with its global responsibilities
10 . South Korea has to “contribute to international 
society” and to “foster its image as an exemplary state in the area of economic development 
and democratization.”(Suh 2009) 
 
According to official sources, in 2009, South Korea provided 8.2million$ of ODA, an amount 
which corresponded to 0.1% of its GNI
11
. In January 2010, South Korea became the 24
th
 
member of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, taking on a greater 
role as a donor of foreign aid.
12
  
A legal framework for South Korean ODA, the “Basic Law for International Development 
Cooperation”, went into effect on July 26, 201013, and established the principles, objectives 
and working mechanisms of South Korean ODA.  
 
In 2012, South Korean ODA amounted to 1,597.5 million$, of which 1183.2 million $ were 
distributed for development assistance in bilateral aid, and 4413.3 million$ in multilateral aid.  
Loans of 714.9 million $ and 468.3 million$ represented respectively 60.4% and 39.6% of the 
bilateral aid. Other 444.5 million $ were provided by the Korea International Cooperation 
Agency (KOICA), a leading implementing agency of grant aid.
14
 
Furthermore, the South Korean government has also committed itself to tripling its ODA 
volume to 3billion$ or 0.25% of its GNI by 2015.  “Korea is also endeavoring to improve the 
quality of development assistance by undertaking fundamental reforms in the ODA system 
including increasing the share of untied aid.”15 
 
 
After it accessed the DAC, the South Korean government also took steps to acquire major 
authority and leadership in international developmental cooperation.  
                                                          
9
 “As the first Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member emerging from the ranks of the least 
developed countries (LDCs), the Republic of Korea attaches great importance to development as part of the 
nation’s grand vision of a "Global Korea.", http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/policy/oda/index.jsp?menu=m_20_110 
10
 http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/policy/oda/index.jsp?menu=m_20_110 
11
 http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/policy/oda/index.jsp?menu=m_20_110  
12
 “The year 2010, when we joined the DAC, is one in which we solidified our foundation as an advanced donor 
country.” , http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/policy/oda/index.jsp?menu=m_20_110 
13
 http://www.odakorea.go.kr/eng.policy.Legal.do  
14
 http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/policy/oda/index.jsp?menu=m_20_110  
15
 http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/policy/oda/index.jsp?menu=m_20_110 
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It announced that it would provide developing countries with a “South Korean model of 
Development Cooperation”.  
On October, 5 2010, it adopted the "Strategic Plan for International Development 
Cooperation”, which introduced core strategies and projects to strengthen South Korea's 
capacity as a development partner. “Three core pillars of strategies included systematically 
documenting the development contents of successes and failures derived from Korea's 
development experience, strengthening ODA implementing capacities, and taking a proactive 
role in addressing global issues.”16 
At the Seoul G20 Summit, the South Korean government pushed for the adoption of the 
“Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth” and the correlated “Multi-Year Action 
Plan on Development” (Lee K-H 2010). According to official sources, “the G20 development 
agenda is tailored to help developing countries build capacity in key areas toward sustainable 
and inclusive economic growth.”17 
In November 2011, the 4
th
 and final High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, hosted by the 
OECD and the World Bank, was held in Busan, South Korea.  
Korean development cooperation is done not only through different kinds of aid (loans, tied 
aid, grants), but also through knowledge and technology transfer, elite training and diffusion 
of principles extracted from the so-called “Korean model”, which emphasizes private sector 
and rural sector development, self-help and responsibility national feelings, and a national 
sense of sacrifice.   
The Ministry of Strategy and Finance is presiding a Knowledge Sharing Program aimed at 
transferring macroeconomic knowledge to developing countries, but also promoting export 
industries, developing SMEs and the “New Village Movement.”18 The Korean International 
Cooperation Agency (KOICA) offers programs on South Korean development experience for 
young developing countries’ elites, along with the Korea Development Institute, funded as the 
research arm of the Economic Planning Board in the Park Chung-hee era
19
.  
 
The New Village Movement, Saemaul Undong has notably been used by current President 
Park Geun-hye
20
 to be a model for developing countries. “Since the country turned into an 
ODA donor, it needs investment, models. The internship center which was built for South 
Korean village leaders has now been renovated and hosts young elites from developing 
countries to train them to Saemaul Undong
 21
, which has been accepted by the United Nations 
as an efficient model of rural development
22
.  
 
This development cooperation has been accompanied by an emphasis on private sector 
development in “development partners” (the new locus for recipient countries) and a clear-cut 
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strategy of mutual benefit- understand market access for Korean goods and companies. This 
has clearly been stated by South Korean diplomacy which explicitly announces that its 
priority recipients are those offering economic opportunities for South Korea, emphasizing 
that this will also be a source of economic growth for the designated “partners”.  
As Korea is increasingly present on the development agenda, it offers, at least discursively, a 
distinct development model than that of traditional, “Western” donors. Indeed, in line with the 
new development locus introduced by emerging donors and taken over by traditional donors 
as well, Korea presents itself not as an aid donor but rather as a development partner. It shows 
no pretention of conditionality, especially in the field of human rights or good governance. It 
presents itself as apolitical, as opposed to a Western aid that has been described as invasive 
and imperialist.  
As noted by R.Eyben and L.Savage,  “Through South-South cooperation, they [the Korean 
government]claimed a relationship with their development partners based on mutual self-
interest and respect for autonomy, which they contrasted sharply with the old colonial powers’ 
vertical relationship with their ertswhile subjects, based on charity and dependency.” (Eyben 
and Savage 2013, 458) 
 
This model has been criticized on the basis that it provides a one-size-fits-all solution to 
developing countries, which might not have the same beneficial conditions that Korea enjoyed 
from the 1960s: a geopolitical environment where it served as a US front against the spread of 
communism in Asia, this providing political support from the hegemon and stability, as well 
as a favourable market access for Korean exports to the US; a strong and authoritarian state 
apparatus committed to capitalist development; a weak landlord capitalist class in Korea that 
could not oppose  industrialization or seek autonomy from state power (Stubbs 2005; Kim 
2004; Glassman and Choi 2014). (Kim 2011) 
 
In reality, Korean development cooperation actually promotes a model that is actually quite 
distinct from what could be described as the Korean experience of development. It 
emphasized SMEs development, while Korea is notably known for having relied on a few 
selected chaebols, thus exhibiting a monopolistic type of capitalism as opposed to a SME-
focused economy. Along with major international organizations committed to development 
(World Bank, IMF, United Nations, to name the major ones), it advocates foreign direct 
investment, market access for Korean companies in its development partners’ markets, and is 
actually largely committed to a, conventionally speaking, neoliberal agenda. But rare are the 
critics that look at the assumptions underlying this discursive advocacy of a new, different, 
grateful Korea paying back its debt to the world.  
A NGO representative I interviewed indeed stated:  “South Korea is just a late comer in the 
neoliberal trajectory, but more or less it is pursuing the same goal as the US and Europe.” 
(personal interview, Manila, 2015) 
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Development cooperation, which is now a prominent aspect of Korean diplomacy, is 
revealing of the way competitiveness has globally become an imperative in formulating 
contemporary diplomacy, especially in the development sector.  
If South Korea promises nothing but a reiteration of the same development theology that has 
been advocated (Rist 2002), perhaps sugar coated by a discursive emphasis on charity, by 
traditional donors, it does not only serve to advance the interest of Korean companies in 
promising developing markets for capital extraction. It is also a strong signal to the world that 
Korea has learnt the lessons of capitalism so well that it can now play its competitive 
advantage in global competitiveness, by being a distinct and apolitical development partner.  
The Korean development model becomes the way for South Korea to be branded as 
“attractive model” and thus compete effectively in the development cooperation marketplace.  
Conclusion: On conceiving of South Korea as a competiveness society 
In this article, I have shown how the governmental problem of competitiveness has become 
embedded in state ideology in Korea, and how the successive Korean governments from the 
late 1980s have participated in the reproduction of this governmental problem.  
Against a restricted definition of neoliberalism that treats it as simply “the withdrawal of the 
state”, I agree with Pirie that South Korea is now an “unambiguously neoliberal state” (Pirie 
2007, 10). The competition state approach proposed by Cerny and enriched by Fougner and 
Cerny complements Pirie’s argumentation. Indeed, the competition state corresponds to what 
Pirie describes in the Korean case as “not a retreat of the state but rather the state as a 
commodifying agent” (Pirie 2007, 5).  Pirie adds: “What is remarkable, however, is the extent 
to which the dictates of the contemporary global neo-liberal order have become embedded 
within the structures of the state.” (Pirie 2007, 121) 
The state paves the way to enabling the “full extension of market discipline to every aspect of 
economic life within Korea” (Pirie 12007, 105). I would go even further.  
I have shown in this article that the Korean state has set the conditions to extent the 
imperative of competitiveness to every sphere of society.  The state, as Foucault already noted, 
is subjected to the logic of the market but nevertheless retains its role of principal agent of the 
competitiveness society.  
The limit of the literature on Korea and globalization is that it takes competitiveness for 
granted, and tends to remain mostly evaluative of the governments’ responses to the problem 
of competitiveness. In this article, I have instead tried to conceive of competitiveness as a 
problem of government, created and managed by governments, along Foucaldian analytical 
lines. This has enabled me to show how national identity was reconceived under the 
imperative of competitiveness, through nation branding, and how political and social domains 
such as labor conditions and development diplomacy were also turned into governmental 
subjects of competitiveness.  
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Indeed, as noted by Yi, “Globalization and the opening of Korea to foreign capital have 
become subjects of everyday conversation. Market opening, competitiveness, efficiency, 
flexibility, restructuring and global standards are the talk of the land.” (Yi 2002, 29) 
The current injunctions, coming from different sites of power (governmental bodies, but also 
academic institutes, research institutes, self-help literature and so forth) to develop flexibility 
and entrepreneurship in all domains of social life are characteristic of the way the 
competitiveness society works. Korean citizens are to be turned into competitive 
entrepreneurs, and have to deal with the rest of society as such. It would be necessary, at this 
stage, to adopt a slightly different methodology and work through social surveys to decipher 
how this competitiveness imperative is now embedded in the most subtle social acts.  
If the consequences of this competitiveness society are worrying for the democratic citizen 
under a nation branding imperative, the worker in an increasingly neoliberal setting, or the 
purpose of global development policies, it is equally needed, if neoliberal governmentality has 
managed to“[turn] market, competition, and consequently firm, into what we could call the 
informing force of society, “(Foucault 2004, 252) to think about what this entails for 
contemporary subjectivities and what purpose we wish to give to the social sphere beyond 
that of a space of pure competitiveness. 
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